Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-known fair allocation mechanism with desirable fairness and efficiency properties; however, with indivisible resources, a CEEI may not exist [Foley 1967; Varian 1974; Thomson and Varian 1985] . It was shown in Budish [2011] that in the case of indivisible resources, there is always an allocation, called A-CEEI, that is approximately fair, approximately truthful, and approximately efficient for some favorable approximation parameters. A heuristic search that attempts to find this approximation is used in practice to assign business school students to courses. In this article, we show that finding the A-CEEI allocation guaranteed to exist by Budish's theorem is PPAD-complete. We further show that finding an approximate equilibrium with better approximation guarantees is even harder: NP-complete.
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) [Foley 1967; Varian 1974 ; Thomson and Varian 1985] is a venerable mechanism with many attractive properties. In CEEI, all agents are allocated the same amount of "funny money," next they declare their preferences, and then a price equilibrium is found that clears the market. The market clearing guarantees Pareto efficiency and feasibility. The mechanism has a strong, albeit technical, ex-post fairness guarantee that emerges from the notion that agents who miss out on a valuable, competitive item will have extra funny money to spend on other items at equilibrium. Truthfulness is problematic-as usual with market mechanisms-but potential incentives for any individual agent to deviate are mitigated by the large number of agents. However, CEEI only works when the resources to be allocated are divisible and the utilities are relatively benign. This restriction has both benefits and drawbacks. It ensures computational feasibility, because CEEI can be computed in polynomial time with a linear or convex program, depending on the utilities involved [Varian 1974; Devanur et al. 2008; Ghodsi et al. 2011 ]; on the other hand, it is easy to construct examples in which CEEI does not exist when preferences are complex or the resources being allocated are not divisible. Indeed, both issues arise in practice in a variety of allocation problems, including shifts to workers, landing slots to airplanes, and the setting that we focus on here-courses to students [Varian 1974; Budish 2011] .
It was recently shown in Budish [2011] that an approximation to a CEEI solution, called A-CEEI, exists even when the resources are indivisible and agent preferences are arbitrarily complex, as required by the course allocation problems that one sees in practice. The approximate solution guaranteed to exist is approximately fair (in that the students are given almost the same budget), and approximately Pareto efficient and feasible (in that all courses are filled close to capacity, with the possible exception of courses with more capacity than popularity). This result seems to be wonderful news for the course allocation problem. However, there is a catch: Budish's proof is nonconstructive, as it relies on Kakutani's fixed-point theorem.
A heuristic search algorithm for solving A-CEEI was introduced in Othman et al. [2010] . The algorithm resembles a traditional tâtonnement process, in which the prices of courses that are oversubscribed are increased and the prices of courses that are undersubscribed are decreased. A modified version of this algorithm that guarantees courses are not oversubscribed is currently used by the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) to assign their MBA students to courses [Budish et al. 2016] . Although it has been documented that the heuristic algorithm often produces much tighter approximations than the theoretical bound, on some instances it fails to find even the guaranteed approximation [Budish 2011, Section 9] .
Thus, A-CEEI is a problem where practical interest motivates theoretical inquiry. We have a theorem that guarantees the existence of an approximate equilibrium-the issue is finding it. Can the heuristic algorithms currently used to assign Wharton MBAs to their courses be replaced by a fast and rigorous algorithm for finding an approximate CEEI? Or are there complexity obstacles to approximating CEEI?
In this article, we show that finding the guaranteed approximation to CEEI is an intractable problem.
Theorem 2, informal statement. The problem of finding an A-CEEI as guaranteed by Budish [2011] is PPAD-complete.
We also show an essentially optimal NP-hardness result for determining whether a better approximation exists.
Theorem 3, informal statement. It is NP-hard to distinguish between an instance where an exact CEEI exists and one in which there is no A-CEEI tighter than guaranteed in Budish [2011] . 
THE COURSE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
Even though the A-CEEI and the existence theorem in Budish [2011] are applicable to a broad range of allocation problems, we shall describe our results in the language of the course allocation problem.
We are given a set of M courses with integer capacities (the supply) (q j ) M j=1 , and a set of N students, where each student i has a set i ⊆ 2 M of permissible course bundles, with each bundle containing at most k ≤ M courses. The set i encodes both scheduling constraints (e.g., courses that meet at the same time) and any constraints specific to student i (e.g., prerequisites).
Each student i has a strict ordering over her permissible schedules, denoted by i . We allow arbitrarily complex preferences-in particular, students may regard courses as substitutes or complements. More formally, we provide the following definition.
Definition 1 (Course Allocation Problem). The input to a course allocation problem consists of the following: -For each student i, a set of course bundles ( i ) N i=1 ; -The students' reported preferences, ( i ) N i=1 ; and -The course capacities, (q j ) M j=1 . The output to a course allocation problem consists of the following:
. How is an allocation evaluated? The clearing error of a solution to the allocation problem is the L 2 norm of the length-M vector of seats oversubscribed in any course or undersubscribed seats in courses with positive price.
Definition 2. The clearing error α of an allocation is
where z j is given by
We can now define the notion of approximate CEEI. The quality of approximation is characterized by two parameters: α, the clearing error (how far is our solution from a true competitive equilibrium?), and β, the bound on the difference in budgets (how far from equal are the budgets?). Informally, α can be thought of as the approximation loss on efficiency, and β can be thought of as the approximation loss on fairness.
Definition 3. An allocation is a (α, β)-CEEI if (1) Each student is allocated her most preferred affordable bundle; formally, (2) Total clearing error is at most α; and (3) Every budget b * i ∈ [1, 1 + β]. In Budish [2011] , it is proved that an (α, β)-approximate CEEI always exists for some quite favorable (and as we shall see, essentially optimal) values of α and β:
THEOREM 1 (BUDISH [2011] ). For any input preferences, there exists an (α, β)-CEEI with α = kM/2 and any β > 0.
Recall that k is the maximum bundle size. The bound of α = kM/2 means that for large number of students and course capacities, the market-clearing error converges to zero quite fast as a fraction of the endowment. It is also shown in Budish [2011] that the mechanism that allocates courses according to such an A-CEEI satisfies attractive criteria of approximate fairness, approximate truthfulness, and approximate Pareto efficiency. The reader may consult Budish [2011] for the precise definitions of the economic properties of the A-CEEI mechanism.
Total Functions and PPAD
Theorem 1 is an example of a nonconstructive existential result; such theorems are common in mathematics and quite often are related to economics (recall Nash's theorem, the Arrow-Debreu model, etc.). It is often important to determine whether there is a polynomial algorithm for finding the solution guaranteed by such a theorem; computational problems of this nature are called total, as they correspond to total functions from inputs to solutions.
Applying the methodology of NP-completeness is problematic in exploring the difficulty of total problems. The intuitive reason is that the language of NP-completeness involves solving a yes-or-no decision question for a specific instance. For example, in 3SAT, we seek to answer the following question: "Does there exist an assignment of variables to values such that the formula is satisfied?" In some instances, the answer is yes, whereas in others, the formula will be unsatisfiable and the answer is no. But questions of this binary nature are a poor fit for total problems like A-CEEI, because by Budish's result, we already know that there exists an (α, β)-CEEI for any input preferences. Hence, the question "Does there exist an (α, β)-CEEI in this economy?" is trivial. This is not just a semantic argument; a reduction from 3SAT relies heavily on the fact that the starting 3SAT instance may be unsatisfiable. Therefore, 3SAT cannot be reduced in any meaningful way to a total problem such as A-CEEI (see Nisan et al. [2007, Chapter 2] for a discussion of this point). NP-completeness does not seem to be an option. But there is an alternative: total problems can often be proved complete for certain complexity classes between P and NP. For example, during the past decade, several game-theoretic problems have been proved complete for the complexity class PPAD, including difficult problems related to fixed point theorems such as those of Brouwer, of Nash, competitive equilibria, and others [Papadimitriou 1994; Abbott et al. 2005; Codenotti et al. 2006; Huang and Teng 2007; Chen et al. 2013; Teng 2009, 2011; Daskalakis et al. 2009; Kintali et al. 2009; Palvolgyi 2009; Vizirani and Yannakakis 2011] .
A-CEEI IS PPAD-COMPLETE
There are several interesting and subtle ways of defining PPAD, but for our purposes it is most convenient to define it as the class of all total problems that are reducible to the problem GCIRCUIT, the problem of finding the fixed point of a continuous function specified by a "generalized circuit." In this section, we show that A-CEEI is PPADcomplete through a reduction from GCIRCUIT.
Informally, in this section, we provide a construction demonstrating that it is possible to define a set of courses, students, and preferences such that the price of the courses in an A-CEEI simulates the various "basic circuit functions" (e.g., an OR gate) that, when combined and wired together, are the necessary building blocks sufficient to emulate any continuous function. Therefore, any algorithm capable of solving A-CEEI in polynomial time would also suffice to solve GCIRCUIT, and hence any problem in PPAD, in polynomial time as well.
We begin by stating our result formally.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem.
Membership in PPAD. We first establish that the problem belongs to the class PPAD; this proof is much harder than usual (see Appendix A). We follow the steps of the existence proof in Budish [2011] and show that each one can be carried out either in polynomial time or through a fixed point. One difficulty is that certain steps of Budish's proof are randomized and must be constructively derandomized in polynomial time.
The problem GCIRCUIT. The reduction is from the PPAD-complete problem GCIRCUIT, alluded to in the previous section.
Generalized circuits are similar to the standard algebraic circuits, the main difference being that generalized circuits contain cycles, which allow them to verify fixed points of continuous functions. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 4 (Generalized Circuits, ). A generalized circuit S is a pair (V, T ), where V is a set of nodes and T is a collection of gates.
are the first and second input nodes of the gate; and v ∈ V is the output node.
The collection T of gates must satisfy the following important property: for every two
Given a generalized circuit, we are interested in the computational problem of finding an assignment that simultaneously satisfies all constraints defined by the gates.
Definition 5. Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), we say that an assignment
where f G is defined as follows, depending on the type of gate G:
Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), -GCIRCUIT is the problem of finding an assignment that -approximately satisfies it. It is shown in Rubinstein [2015] to be PPAD-complete for some small constant > 0 and circuits with fan-out 2.
Overview of the reduction. We shall reduce -GCIRCUIT with fan-out 2 to the problem of finding an (α, β)-CEEI, with approximation parameters α = (N/M) and = (β). 3 (Note that by increasing N, we can make α arbitrarily large as a function of M-in particular, α > kM/2.)
We will construct gadgets (i.e., small sets of courses, students, capacities, and preferences) for the various types of gates in the generalized circuit. Each gadget that we construct has one or more dedicated "input course," a single "output course," and possibly some "interior courses." An output course of one gadget can (and will) be an input to another. The construction will guarantee that in any A-CEEI, the price of the output course will be approximately equal to the gate applied to the prices of the input courses.
Gate gadgets.
To illustrate what needs to be done, we proceed to construct a gate for the function f G ¬ (x) = 1 − x-in particular, this implements a logical NOT.
LEMMA 3.1 (NOT GADGET). Let n x > 4α, and suppose that the economy contains the following courses:
-c x (the input course), -c 1−x with capacity q 1−x = n x /2 (the output course), and the following set of students:
-n x students interested only in the schedule {c x , c 1−x }; suppose further that at most n 1−x = n x /4 other students are interested in course c 1−x . Then in any (α, β)-CEEI,
then none of the n x students will be able to afford the bundle {c x , c 1−x }, and therefore there will be at most n 1−x = n x /4 students enrolled in the c 1−x -much less than the capacity n x /2. Therefore,
x , then all n x students can afford the bundle {c x , c 1−x }-therefore, the course will be overbooked by n x /2, and thus z 1−x ≥ n x /2.
Similarly, we construct gadgets that simulate all gates of the generalized circuit. LEMMA 3.2. Let n x ≥ 2 8 · α, and suppose that the economy has courses c x and c y . Then for any of the gate functions f G in the definition of -GCIRCUIT, we can add a course c z , and at most n x students interested in each of c x and c y , such that in any (α, β)-CEEI,
In particular, p * z continues to satisfy the preceeding inequalities in every (α, β)-CEEI even if up to n z ≤ n x /2 8 additional students (beyond the ones needed in the proof) are interested in course c z .
We defer the proof of Lemma 3.2 to the Appendix.
Course-size amplification. So far, we have constructed gadgets that compute all gates necessary for the circuit in the reduction from -GCIRCUIT. What happens when we try to concatenate them to form a circuit? Recall the last sentence in the statement of Lemma 3.2. It says that the prices continue to behave like the gate that is simulated, as long as there are not too many additional students who try to take the output course. (If there are more students, they may raise the price of the course beyond what we expect.) In particular, the number of additional students who may want the output course is smaller than the number of students who want the input course.
If we concatenated the gadgets without change, we would need to have larger course sizes as we increase the depth of the simulated circuit. This increase in course size is exponential in the depth of the circuit. Things get even worse-since we reduce from generalized circuits, our gates form cycles. If the course size must increase at every gate, it would have to be infinite! To overcome this problem, we construct a COPY gadget that preserves the price from the input course but is robust to twice as many additional students. LEMMA 3.3 (COURSE-SIZE AMPLIFICATION GADGET). Let n x ≥ 100α, and suppose that the economy contains the following courses:
-c x (the input course); -for i = 1, . . . 10, c i with capacities q i = 0.5 · n x (interior courses); -c x with capacity q x , subject to q x ≤ q x ≤ 4n x (output course); and the following sets of students:
-n x students interested in schedules ({cx, c i }) 10 i=1 (in this order), -n i = 0.49 · n x students (∀i) interested in schedules
. . , {c 10 }) (in this order);
suppose further that at most n x = 2n x other students are interested in course c x . Then in any (α, β)-CEEI,
In particular, notice that the price of c x is guaranteed to approximate the price of c x , even in the presence of additional n x = 2n x students-twice as many students as we added to c x . PROOF. We start by proving that all c i 's simulate NOT gadgets simultaneously-that is, for every i and every (α, β)-CEEI,
assume without loss of generality that it is the first such i-that is, p * j ≤ 1 − p * x + β < p * i for every j < i. None of the n x students can afford buying both c x and c i . Furthermore, for every j < i, none of the n j students will prefer c i over c j . Therefore, at most n i students will take this course: z * i ≥ 0.01n x .
-If, on the other hand, p * i < 1 − p * x , then all n x students will buy course c i or some previous course c j (for j ≤ i); additionally, for every j ≤ i, each of the n j corresponding students will buy some course c k for j ≤ k ≤ i. Therefore, the total overbooking of courses 1, . . . , i will be at least j≤i z * j ≥ n x · (1 − 0.01i) -a contradiction to (α, β)-CEEI.
-If p * x > p * x + β, then none of the n i students, for any n i , can afford buying both c x and c i . Therefore, even in the presence of additional n x = 2n x . students who want to take c x , the course will be undersubscribed by z *
x < x+β, then all n i students, for each i, can afford to buy their top schedule-both {c i , c x }. Therefore, c x will be oversubscribed by at least z * x ≥ 0.9 · n x -a contradiction to (α, β)-CEEI.
Finally, given an instance of -GCIRCUIT with fan-out 2, we can use the gadgets that we constructed in Lemmas 3.1 through 3.3 to construct an instance of (α, β)-CEEI that simulates the generalized circuit. We concatenate gadgets by identifying the output course of one gadget with the input course of the next two gadgets. In particular, after each gate gadget, we insert a series of course-size amplifying gadgets. Each amplifying gadget doubles the number of additional students the gadget can tolerate, so a constant number of amplifying gadgets suffice; thus, the blowup in error is also constant. As for the size of the reduction, each gadget introduces a constant number of new courses and (α) new students; thus, M = (|V |) and N = (α · |V |), where |V | is the number of gates in the generalized circuit. Budish [2011] shows that his existence theorem is tight-that is, there exist economies in which it is impossible to achieve less than ( √ kM) market-clearing error. One may hope that on instances encountered in practice, a better approximation may be possible, and finding it may not be prohibitively hard. We next show that even in economies that admit an exact CEEI, it is NP-hard to find even a constant factor improvement over the ( √ kM) bound.
NP HARDNESS
THEOREM 3. It is NP-hard to distinguish between an economy that has an exact CEEI and an economy that does not have a ( ( √ N + M), β)-CEEI for any 0 ≤ β < 1.
In particular, since our reduction uses a constant k, it means that it is NP-complete to find an ( ( √ kM), β)-CEEI-an approximation factor smaller only by a multiplicative constant than the approximation guaranteed by the existence theorem of Budish [2011] .
Comparison to Theorem 2. Theorem 2 is in some sense stronger than Theorem 3 in that it applies to a larger market-clearing error. In turn, Theorem 3 is stronger in two ways: (1) it gives NP-hardness as opposed to PPAD-hardness, and (2) it applies to any 0 ≤ β < 1 as opposed to a much smaller (yet constant) β.
Proof
We reduce from 3SAT-5-that is, a SAT instance in which every clause contains exactly three variables, and each variable appears in exactly five clauses. Feige [1998] proved that it is NP-hard to distinguish between a satisfiable 3SAT-5 instance and a 3SAT-5 instance where at most 1 − can be satisfied for some > 0. 4 Given a 3SAT-5 formula, we construct a gadget for each variable and each clause. The gadgets are constructed so that for any assignment that completely satisfies the formula, there exists an exact CEEI in the economy. Figure 1 shows some example gadgets. Furthermore, given an approximate CEEI for the economy that exactly clears the courses in a subset of the gadgets, one can recover an assignment for the 3SAT-5 formula that satisfies all clauses corresponding to the same subset. Informally, this means that for every clause that we are unable to satisfy in the 3SAT-5 formula, there must be a deviation from exact market clearing in the gadget corresponding to either that clause or one of its variables. Figure 2 shows an example of how gadgets are composited.
Because we use a sparse 3SAT, each deviation from market clearing can affect at most five clauses. Each variable gadget uses 13 courses, and each clause gadget uses only 1 more. For an instance with n clauses and 3 5 n variables, we have exactly M = 44 5 n courses. Finally, if n of the clauses are unsatisfied, then the market-clearing error must be at least 1 5 · n = 44 · M. Since N < M and > 0 is a constant, we get NP-hardness with α = ( √ M + N).
Variable gadget. For each variable x i , we have a variable gadget that forces a consistent assignment to x i . The gadget contains five pairs of output courses O j T , O j F ; each of these pairs is also part of the input courses of a clause gadget. Additionally, the gadget has three inner courses: D L , D C , D R . The gadget also has two students: s T has the 20:10 A. Othman et al. Fig. 2 . Putting the gadgets together.
We say that x i = True whenever S T is assigned her second bundle and x i = False otherwise. Then: -Soundness: We show that whenever the variable gadget introduces no marketclearing error, exactly one of the gadget students is assigned her second bundle. It is easy to see that at most one student can be assigned her second bundle: otherwise, neither student will be assigned D C ; yet if D C has price zero, then both students would prefer the respective bundles that contain it. If, on the other hand, neither O j T nor O j F is assigned, we must again have a nonzero market-clearing error for the courses in this gadget: -If all inner courses have price zero, then D C will be overdemanded.
-If D L and D R have price zero, then under any assignment either one of the three will be overdemanded or D C will be underdemanded. -If p (DC) = 0, p (DL) > 0, and, without loss of generality, p (DL) ≥ p (DR), then either D C will be overdemanded or D L will be underdemanded. -Finally, since β < 1, if D C has nonzero price, then either it is underdemanded or one of the three inner courses must be overdemanded. -Completeness: For an assignment with x i = True, let the prices of O j T , O j F , D L , D C , D R be 1 6 , 0, 1 6 , 1, 0, respectively. Under these prices, student s T will prefer bundle
For each clause containing variables {X, Y, Z}, consider seven courses: six input courses X T , X F , Y T , Y F , Z T , Z F (where each pair is the output courses of a variable gadget) and a single "budget diluting" course D. We also have a single gadget student, who is interested in any of the seven bundles corresponding to a satisfying assignment.
For example if the clause is (X ∨ ¬Y ∨ Z), the gadget student would be interested in the following bundles:
In particular, the student is not interested in bundle {X T , Y F , Z T , D}, which corresponds to assigning (X = False, Y = True, Z = False). Then:
-Soundness: Observe that if the variable gadgets students are assigned courses X a , Y b , and Z c , and the clause gadget has zero market-clearing error, then the clause gadget student must be assigned bundle {X ¬a , Y ¬b , Z ¬c , D}. -Completeness: Suppose that the variable gadgets students are assigned courses X a , Y b , and Z c , each with price at least 1 6 , whereas courses X ¬a , Y ¬b , and Z ¬c are all unassigned. Then if we set the price of D to be 1, the only affordable bundle for the clause gadget student is indeed {X ¬a , Y ¬b , Z ¬c , D}.
DISCUSSION
In this work, we classified the computational complexity of finding an approximate CEEI as a function of the precision parameter α of the approximation, the marketclearing error. We showed that finding (α, β)-CEEI is PPAD-complete when α is large enough to guarantee existence, whereas finding a better approximation to CEEI is NP-complete.
One potential way around these intractability results could be to restrict the input language of preferences. This has been a fruitful line of research in combinatorial auctions [Nisan 2006; Sandholm and Boutilier 2006] . However, in contrast to that space, we do not anticipate limiting language complexity in the course allocation problem to be fruitful either in theory or in practice. Recall that the student preferences used in the PPAD-hardness proof are already very simple. Furthermore, in practice, there are significant inherent complexities in students' preferences-for example, courses meeting at the same time and courses with multiple sections.
Despite the negative results shown in this article, a heuristic search algorithm exists that finds practical solutions to A-CEEI. Interestingly, in both laboratory experiments, as well as in real course allocation problems, this heuristic often finds solutions that are an order of magnitude better than the theoretical kM 2 guarantee on the clearing error [Othman et al. 2010; Budish et al. 2016 ]-a performance that we have shown NP-hard to guarantee. Once again, we are faced with a familiar conundrum. What are the characteristics of the instances appearing in practice that enable this favorable performance? And how can one develop a rigorous fast algorithm for them?
APPENDIXES

A. A-CEEI ∈ PPAD
We show that computing a ( √ σ M 2 , β)-CEEI is in PPAD for σ = min{2k, M}. Remark 1. We assume that the student preferences ( i ) are given in the form of an ordered list of all bundles in i (i.e., all bundles that student i prefers over the empty bundle). In particular, we assume that the total number of permissible bundles is polynomial.
Remark 2. In fact, we prove that the following slightly more general problem is in PPAD: Given any β, > 0 and initial approximate-budgets vector b ∈ [1, 1 + β] N , find a ( √ σ M 2 , β)-CEEI with budgets b * such that |b i − b * i | < for every i. Our proof will follow the steps of the existence proof by Budish [2011] . We will use the power of PPAD to solve the Kakutani problem and derandomize the other nonconstructive ingredients. 
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A.1. Preliminaries
Our algorithm receives as input an economy ((q j ) M j=1 ,
, parameters β, > 0, and an initial approximate-budgets vector b ∈ [1, 1+β] N . We denoteβ = min{β, }/2.
We will consider M-dimensional price vectors in P = [0, 1 + β + ] M . To define a price adjustment function, we consider an enlargementP = [−1, 2 + β + ] M , as well as a truncation function t :P → P (whose j-th coordinate is given by t j (p j ) = min{max{p j , 0}, 1 + β + }).
For each student i, we denote her demand at pricesp with budget b i by
Given the total demand of all students, we can define the excess demand to be
A key ingredient to the analysis is the budget-constraint hyperplanes. These are the hyperplanes in price space along which a student can exactly afford a specific bundle. For each student i and bundle x, the corresponding budget-constraint hyperplane is defined as H (i, x) = {p ∈ P :p · x = b i }.
A.2. Deterministically Finding a "General Position" Perturbation (Step 1)
It is convenient to assume that the budget-constraint hyperplanes are in "general position"-that is, there is no pointp ∈ P at which any subset of linearly dependent budget-constraint hyperplanes intersect (in particular, no more than M hyperplanes intersect at any point). In the existence proof, this is achieved by assigning a small random reverse tax τ i,x ∈ (− , ) for each student i and bundle x; i's modified cost for bundle x at pricesp becomesp · x − τ i,x . Given taxes τ = (τ i,x ) i∈S,x∈ i , we redefine d i (p, b i , τ i ), z(p, b, τ ), and H(i, x, τ i,x ) analogously.
In this section, we show how to deterministically choose these taxes.
LEMMA A.1. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a vector of taxes τ = (τ i,x ) i∈S,x∈ i such that PROOF. Assume without loss of generality that b is rounded to the nearest integer multiple ofβ M −M ; otherwise, we can include this rounding in the taxes.
We proceed by induction on the pairs (i, x) of students and bundles: at each step, let τ i,x be much smaller in absolute value than all taxes introduced so far. (For each i, we consider the (i, x)'s either in the order i or in the reverse order, maintaining Property 2 depending on the sign of τ i,x .) More precisely, if (i, x) is the νth pair to be considered, then we set
where the sign is chosen such that condition 3 in the statement of the lemma is preserved. Now, assume by contradiction that there exists a k-tuple H(i 1 , x 1 , τ i 1 ,x 1 ), . . . , H(i k , x k , τ i k ,x k ) of hyperplanes that intersect at price vectorp, and such that the x i 's are linearly dependent. (Note that the latter holds, in particular, for every (M + 1)tuple.)
Assume further, without loss of generality, that this is the first such k-tuple with respect to the order of the induction. In particular, this means that {x 1 , . . . , x k−1 } are linearly independent. Now consider the system
. Notice that it has rank k−1. We can now take k−1 linearly independent rows j 1 , . . . j k−1 such that the following system has the same unique solution α:
Since X is a square matrix of full rank, it is invertible. Thus, we have that
Now, recall that
where X i, j is the (i, j)-cofactor of X. Finally, since X is a Boolean matrix, its determinant and all of its cofactors are integers of magnitude less than (k − 1) k−1 ≤ M M . The entries of α are therefore rational fractions with numerators and denominators of magnitude less than M M . Now, by our assumption by contradiction, k hyperplanes intersect atp:
Therefore,
However, if (ik, x k) is the νth pair added by the induction, then the following is an integer:
By our assumption that all budgets are rounded,
This yields a contradiction to Equation (1).
A.3. Finding a Fixed Point (Steps 2 Through 4)
This section describes the price adjustment correspondence of Budish [2011] , and is brought here mostly for completeness.
We first define the price adjustment function:
Observe that ifp * is a fixed pointp * = f (p * ) of f , then its truncation t (p * ) = p * defines an exact competitive equilibrium. 7 Yet we know that the economy may not have an exact equilibrium-and indeed f is discontinuous at the budget-constraint hyperplanes, and so it is not guaranteed to have a fixed point. Instead, we define an upper hemicontinuous, set-valued "convexification" of f : F (p) = co {y : ∃ a sequence p w → p, p = p w ∈ P such that f (p w ) → y} .
The correspondence F is upper hemicontinuous, nonempty, and convex; therefore, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem, it has a fixed point (i.e., a price vector that satisfies p * ∈ F (p * )). By Papadimitriou [1994] , finding a Kakutani fixed point of F is in PPAD.
Working with Finite Precision. To be rigorous, we need to complete a few subtle numerical details about finding a fixed point of F. We round all price vectors to a the nearest integer multiple of δ := (β M 1 2 −2(ν max +1)M ) (this precision suffices to implement the algorithm in Lemma A.1).
At any point on the δ-grid, the price of any bundle is an integer multiple of δ; therefore, any budget-constraint hyperplane that does not contain p must be at (L 1 ) distance at least δ. In particular, this means that every δ/2-approximate fixed point of F is also an exact fixed point. Finally, we can use the PPAD algorithm of Papadimitriou [1994] to find a δ/2-approximate fixed point.
There is also an issue of computing the correspondence F. From the proof of Papadimitriou [1994] , it follows that it suffices to compute just a single point in F (p) for every p. This is important because the number of points in F (p) on the δ-grid may be exponential. As we mentioned earlier, every budget-constraint hyperplane that does not contain t (p) must be at least δ-far. Therefore, we can take any point p whose truncation t (p ) is at distance δ/2 from t (p) and does not lie on any hyperplanes. (p will not be on the δ-grid.) Because no budget-constraint hyperplanes lie between t (p ) and t (p), it follows that t(p) + 1 2N z(t(p ); b, τ ) ∈ F(p).
7 See Budish [2011, Appendix A,
Step 2] for more details. Finally, the choice of (θ i ) L i=1 induces the promised price vector p φ . The chosen (θ i ) L i=1 define an allocation x * with bounded clearing error. We now follow Step 9 of Budish [2011] to define budgets b * such that x * is the preferred consumption by all the students at price p * .
We define, for every i, b * i = b i + τ i,x * i . For i > L , we have x * i = d i (p * , b i , τ i ). By requirement 2 of Lemma A.1, every bundle that student i prefers over x * i had a greater tax and was still unaffordable at p * ; it now costs more than b i + τ i,x * i . For i ≤ L , notice that for every bundle x ⊥ i that i prefers over x * i and was exactly affordable at p * with taxes τ and budget b, x ⊥ must cost strictly more than i's new budget b * i . Therefore, (x * , b * , p * ) is a ( √ σ M 2 , β)-CEEI.
B. ADDITIONAL GADGETS FOR THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Lemma 3.2.
LEMMA 3.2 Let n x ≥ 2 8 · α, and suppose that the economy has courses c x and c y . Then for any of the functions f listed in the following, we can add a course c z , and at most n x students interested in each of c x and c y , such that in any (α, β)-CEEI, (6) AND: f G ∧ (x, y) = 1 x > 1 2 + β ∧ y > 1 2 + β 0 x < 1 2 − β ∨ y < 1 2 − β .
(7) OR: f G ∨ (x, y) = 1 x > 1 2 + β ∨ y > 1 2 + β 0 x < 1 2 − β ∧ y < 1 2 − β .
(6) AND: Let c 1 2 be a course with price p * 1 2 ∈ [ 1 2 , 1 2 + β] and n1 2 = n x /8, as guaranteed by gadget VALUE, and let q z = n x /32 and n z = n x /64. Consider n x /16 students wishing to take ({c x , c 1 2 }, {c y , c 1 2 }, {c z }), in this order:
-If ( p * x > 1 2 + β) ∧ ( p * y > 1 2 + β), then the n x /16 students can afford neither pair. They will all try to sign up for c z , forcing p * z > 1, in any (α, β)-CEEI. -If (x < 1 2 − β) ∨ (y < 1 2 − β), then the n x /16 students can afford at least one of the pairs and will register for those courses. Thus, p * z = 0. (7) OR: Similar to the AND gadget; students will want ({c x , c y , c 1 2 }, {c z }), in this order.
